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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN AFRICA:
IMPARTIALITY, POLITICS, COMPLEMENTARITY
AND BREXIT
Bartram S. Brown *
I have known and been inspired by Henry J. Richardson III and his
scholarship for many years. A hallmark of his work has been his focus upon
African-American interests in international law and also upon the rights and
interests of African states. In acknowledgement of that intellectual debt, it is my
honor to dedicate the following article to this festschrift celebrating his life and
work.
I. INTRODUCTION
The negotiation of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) was a diplomatic achievement, but only a limited one. To build a broad
international consensus, many compromises were incorporated into the text of the
Statute. Perhaps the most fundamental of these compromises concerns
complementarity, a formula for balancing the jurisdiction of the ICC and that of
States. The Court was left with often frustrating limits to its jurisdiction and
enforcement powers. Even today the ICC remains very much a work-in-progress.
All the initial cases before the ICC have arisen from states on the African
continent, and this fact has fed perceptions of partiality and of anti-African bias. It
*
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1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See What is Complementarity?, INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, https://www.ictj
.org/complementarity-icc/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (explaining the structure of
complementarity and providing examples of its impact on the ICC).
3. In addition to the seven African countries in which the ICC has brought individual cases
against an accused (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire, Libya, Kenya,
Sudan, and Central African Republic), there are, as of this writing, nine countries (eight outside
Africa) in which the ICC is conducting preliminary examinations (Afghanistan, Burundi,
Colombia, Guinea, Iraq/UK, Nigeria, Palestine, Ukraine, and Registered Vessels of Comoros,
Greece and Cambodia), as well as a couple of additional countries in which the ICC has situations
under investigation (Mali and Georgia.) See, e.g., Mali: Situation in the Republic of Mali, ICC
01/12, https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); Georgia: Situation in Georgia,
ICC-01/15, https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). This suggests that there
will likely be ICC cases outside of the African continent relatively soon. See generally INT‘L
CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
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also means that all the Court‘s decisions giving specific meaning to the concept of
complementarity have been rendered in the context of cases from that continent.
African sensibilities, while perhaps not decisive, should rightly be relevant.
Post-colonial African governments can be sensitive to perceived slights by
institutions seen as shaped or controlled by Western powers. African states were
strong early supporters of the ICC, but that support has been shaken in the wake of
ICC charges brought against two sitting African heads of state, Omar Al Bashir of
Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. As of 2016, three African states had given
official notice of their intent to exit from the ICC‘s global framework. In this
retreat from internationalism, the political dynamic behind the United Kingdom‘s
(UK‘s) Brexit vote has found its expression in Africa and has been invoked there
to justify resistance to the jurisdiction and authority of the ICC.
The ICC has a very real problem with Africa, but it is more than a simple
matter of anti-African neo-colonial bias. In fact, upon closer examination, the
argument that the ICC has targeted African states is quite weak. While it is true
that so far the ICC has brought cases in only seven countries, all of which are in
Africa, it is also true that the governments of four of those seven states took the
initiative to voluntarily self-refer a situation on their territory to the ICC. These
ICC self-referrals are an expression of state consent for which the ICC cannot, in
all fairness, be held responsible. Likewise, the situations in Sudan and in Libya
were referred to the ICC by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, not by
decision of the ICC itself. Thus, of all the ICC cases so far, only the Kenya cases
were initiated by decision of the ICC. The handful of criminal cases brought
within this one situation can hardly be evidence of anti-African bias sufficient to
justify a possible mass exodus of African states from the ICC. But the ICC has
other, very real problems that must be addressed.
From the start, there has been enormous pressure on the ICC and its officials
to deliver justice, and such great expectations can be hard to meet. Some degree of
4. Somini Sengupta, Omar al-Bashir Case Shows International Criminal Court‟s
Limitations, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/suda
n-bashir-international-criminal-court.html.
5. The three African States are: South Africa, Burundi and Gambia. AP Explains: Why
African states have started leaving the ICC, FOX NEWS (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com
/world/2016/10/26/ap-explains-why-african-states-have-started-leaving-icc.html.
6. See Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the
EU, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 (detailing the
political dynamic behind the U.K.‘s Brexit vote).
7. The four ICC self-referrals were from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Central African Republic, and Mali. Africa: Should African Countries Quit the ICC?, ALL
AFRICA (Nov. 2, 2016), http://allafrica.com/stories/201611020460.html.
8. See Tiina Intelmann, The International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security
Council: Perceptions and Politics, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tiinaintelmann/icc-un-security-council_b_3334006.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (discussing the
U.N. Security Council‘s two referral situations in Sudan and Libya).
9. See Karen Rothmyer, International Criminal Court on Trial in Kenya, NATION (May 9,
2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/international-criminal-court-trial-kenya/ (―Kenya was
the first ICC initiated case, even though it has never had a single non-African case before it.‖).
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disappointment with the work of the ICC may therefore have been inevitable. Even
today, the consensus on certain very central aspects of the ICC is ―fragile.‖ In
particular, there is controversy about how the complementary jurisdiction of the
Court should balance national and international jurisdiction. It is especially in this
area that the ICC has clashed with African leaders.
Should the Rome Statute be interpreted broadly, creatively, and in a dynamic
and teleological spirit, so as to extend the Court‘s effective jurisdiction as far as
possible and (hopefully) to achieve, as quickly and as fully as possible, the lofty
purposes for which it was created? Or should the admissibility criteria set out in
the Rome Statute be interpreted strictly and with deference to the residual
sovereign prerogatives of states? These contrasting approaches, and the arguments
for and against them, are familiar to legal scholars around the world, and are as
relevant to the ICC as they are to interpretation of the United States (U.S.)
Constitution or U.S. federal law.
This paper is not an argument against effective international institutions,
much less an argument for continuing impunity. There are clear and powerful
reasons for wanting to ensure the strongest, most independent and effective ICC
possible. These include the belief that impunity for serious international crimes
today only encourages those who might be tempted to commit them tomorrow and,
of course, because the victims of serious international crimes have a right to expect
justice. The Rome Statute was intended to address this problem of impunity.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the
terms of a treaty are first and foremost to be interpreted in accordance with their
―ordinary meaning.‖ This common-sense rule is of limited utility since the Rome
Statute often uses ordinary words in very technical and extraordinary ways. The
VCLT also recognizes that treaty terms are to be interpreted ―in their context and
in the light of . . . [the treaty‘s] object and purpose.‖ This opens the door to the
teleological approach to treaty interpretation, mentioned above, which stresses the
intended goals of the parties.

10. See Jan Guardian, Reaching Mutual Consensus: ICC, ICJ, and the Crime of Aggression,
A CONTRARIO ICL: REFLECTIONS & COMMENTARY ON GLOBAL JUST. ISSUES (Oct. 12, 2012),
https://acontrarioicl.com/2012/10/12/crime-of-aggression-international-criminal-court/
(―The consequence of such an occurrence in the cases brought before the ICJ and the ICC appears
to be particularly problematic given the highly-charged political atmosphere in which the ICC has
been operating during the years, its fragile credibility and a lack of a proper institutional hierarchy
within the international legal system.‖).
11. See Oscar Solera, Complementary Jurisdiction and International Criminal Justice,
INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/145-172-solera.pdf
(last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (arguing for necessities and possible solutions to reconcile
international and national jurisdictions).
12. ―A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
13. Id.
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But what exactly was the goal in creating the ICC? The ICC‘s function is to
prevent impunity for serious international crimes. But was the goal to maximize
the Court‘s effective jurisdiction over those crimes today, or to build more
carefully and deliberately towards that goal over time by staying faithful, for now,
to that institution‘s founding consensus? Which approach is more appropriate?
Universality of ICC membership is essential to the success of the ICC, but
progress towards that goal is directly undermined when the ICC is perceived to be
undermining the legitimate rights and prerogatives of States Parties through
jurisdictional overreach. The difficulty is to discern exactly how far the jurisdiction
of the ICC should extend in any given circumstance. Complementarity is the
agreed formula for balancing national and international jurisdiction, but in practice
it could be calibrated in a range of ways. One version of complementarity might
attempt to transform the ICC into a robust international court freely sharing
concurrent jurisdiction with national justice systems. Another version, more
deferential to the jurisdiction of states, might reduce the ICC to a much more
restrained and patient international court of last resort. In practice, the difference
between the two could turn on little more than the discretion of the ICC
Prosecutor.
The experience of the ICC so far suggests that it is reasonably capable of
investigating and prosecuting situations that are self-referred to it by the state
directly concerned. In contrast, cases emerging from the two situations referred
by the U.N. Security Council have largely stalled due to the Council‘s failure to
follow through. But a separate and more delicate set of issue arises when the ICC
Prosecutor decides to initiate a case on her own authority (proprio motu) under
Article 15 paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute. Any interested state may challenge
the admissibility of such a case before the ICC, and that challenge raises a
multitude of difficult questions concerning the implementation of
complementarity.
This paper argues that in its haste to provide answers to all these questions,
the Court has failed so far to develop a balanced and viable approach to
complementarity. Instead, the ICC‘s judges have interpreted the Rome Statute‘s
jurisdictional provisions in a manner inconsistent with the essential bargain on
complementarity jurisdiction reached at the 1998 Rome Conference. The
14. See About, INT‘L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(―The Court is participating in a global fight to end impunity, and through international criminal
justice, the Court aims to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes and to help prevent
these crimes from happening again.‖).
15. See Africa: Should African Countries Quit the ICC?, supra note 7.
16. See Rebecka Buchanan, Security Council Referral to the ICC: A help or a hindrance in
achieving peace, HUMAN SEC. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.hscentre.org/globalgovernance/security-council-referral-icc-help-hindrance-achieving-peace/ (discussing difficulties
faced by Security Council while referring cases to ICC).
17. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, ¶ 1.
18. Id. art. 19 ¶ 2.
19. See Summary of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/news/1998/12/01/summary-key-provisions-icc-statute (Dec. 1, 1998)
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unintended consequence has been to create a deficit in the perceived legitimacy of
the ICC. The existence of this legitimacy deficit is particularly unfortunate because
the ICC is still effectively within its initial trial period during which it must, among
other things, seek to attract the future support of India, Russia, China, and the U.S.,
four ICC non-State Parties that govern the vast majority of the world‘s population.
There is justifiable concern that if the ICC does not modify its current tone and
approach, it is more likely to lose support of those countries that have accepted it
than it is to gain the additional support it will ultimately need to realize its greatest
potential.
A different and more careful approach is required based on the text of the
Rome Statute, the negotiating history of that treaty, and the practical realities and
constraints faced by the ICC. This is especially important during this Brexit era of
heightened skepticism regarding international institutions. In particular, the ICC
needs to both undertake a general recalibration of complementarity and adopt a
more patient and cooperative attitude which invites states to contribute, to the
greatest extent possible, in the formulation, adjustment, and practical application of
ICC standards and procedures. Complementarity should not be a one-way street in
which the states learn at the feet of an all-knowing ICC.
Following this introduction, this paper will successively consider: the thorny
issue of impartiality; the occasional need for political prudence, even in deciding
technical matters such as jurisdiction; the appropriate balance between national and
international jurisdiction under the complementarity formula; Africa‘s critical role
in the ICC; the developing African Regional critique of the ICC; and the relevance
of Brexit to developments in international criminal justice.
II. IMPARTIALITY VS. POLITICS: A FALSE DICHOTOMY
A. Impartiality
The ICC has consistently maintained that its work is completely non-political
and impartial. The first ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, often invoked the
simplified and largely false dichotomy of a court independent of all political
considerations (his guiding vision of the ICC) versus a compromised and
(explaining the challenges facing the admissibility of complementarity jurisdiction).
20. Hunt & Wheeler, supra note 6.
21. Ocampo has said elsewhere that the ultimate goal is less to convict criminals than it is to
send a message to deter them. Some people would probably see this goal as too political, and
inadequately focused on the ―technical‖ goal of a conviction. James Verini, The Prosecutor and
the President, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/magazin
e/international-criminal-court-moreno-ocampo-the-prosecutor-and-the-president.html. ―MorenoOcampo says he did everything he could to convict Kenyatta, but . . . [t]he message a case sends,
the shadow of the court — that was the goal. The problem with courts, Moreno-Ocampo told me,
is they ‗believe the trials are the most important things. No. The most important thing is the
prevention of crime.‘ He had set out to prevent future political violence in Kenya, and in this
sense at least, the Kenyatta case was a success. ‗The suspect became president. But there was no
violence in the elections.‘‖ Id.
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illegitimate political court. He declared himself the champion of the non-political
cause. Fatou Bensouda, the current ICC Prosecutor, also insists that she and her
office act in complete independence and impartiality.
In one interview, Prosecutor Bensouda describes the workings of the ICC as if
the institution were ethereally abstracted from any external political reality. She
clarified her views in an interview with an Israeli newspaper.
How will you deal with the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian case is a
political ―hot potato‖?
―While I am fully cognizant of the political complexities of this lingering
conflict, mine is a legal mandate. All I can and will do is to apply the law
in strict conformity with the Rome Statute [of the International Criminal
Court], with full independence and impartiality as I have done with all
our cases and situations to date. We operate in a highly political world
where we will face reactions to the decisions we take based on our legal
mandate.‖
―Let me reassure you that as prosecutor, political considerations have
never, and will never form any part of my decision making. My duty
firmly remains to simply apply the law to whatever situation is before the
court.‖
The ICC Prosecutor must rightly stress the legal and technical side of her task.
To do less would encourage political second-guessing of every decision she makes.
But the view of the relationship between law and politics expressed by the

22. Lius Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40
CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 215, 224 (2008). ―The law will prevail. Remember how difficult it was
for national systems to develop automatic compliance with judicial decisions? We can learn from
what happened in the United States almost two centuries ago. When the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled against Georgia in a conflict about Cherokee lands, Georgia ignored the judicial decision.
When asked about the case, President Andrew Jackson reportedly said, ‗John Marshall [the
Supreme Court] has made his decision, now let him enforce it.‘ Things have changed since then.
We are witnessing the beginning of a new legal era. We are building a global criminal justice
system to prevent atrocities and end impunity for the most serious crimes. The Prosecutor‘s duty
is to apply the law without bowing to political considerations, and I will not adjust my practices
to political considerations. It is time for political actors to adjust to the law.‖ Id.
23. Asked if he was ‗becoming a politician at the ICC‘, Moreno-Ocampo answered, ―on the
contrary, I am putting a legal limit to the politicians. That is my job. I police the borderline and
say, if you cross this you‘re no longer on the political side, you are on the criminal side. I am the
border control.‖ Patrick Smith, Interview: Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor, AFRICAN
REPORT (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.theafricareport.com/News-Analysis/interview-luis-morenoocampo-icc-prosecutor.html.
24. At a 2015 press conference Prosecutor Bensouda stated, ―I wish to underscore here that,
without exception, we conduct our investigations in complete independence and impartiality. We
have always been, and continue to be, guided by these same principles with respect to our work.‖
Fatou Bensouda, Statement at a Press Conference in Uganda: Justice Will Ultimately Be
Dispensed for LRA Crimes, RELIEF WEB (Feb. 27, 2015), http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/state
ment-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-press-conference.
25. Aeyal Gross, ICC Prosecutor: Low-ranking Israeli Soldiers, as Well as Palestinians,
Could Be Prosecuted for War Crimes, HAARETZ (May 1, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://www.haaretz.co
m/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.654516 (alterations in original).

_31.1_BARTRAM BROWN_ ARTICLE 9 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN AFRICA

4/21/2017 3:17 PM

151

Prosecutor here is positively Manichean in that it places law on a pedestal,
representing everything virtuous, legitimate, technical, valid, and impartial, and
dismisses each and every political consideration as irrelevant or at least
presumptively illegitimate. In reality, the ICC must draw a careful line between
those political matters that might compromise the functions of the ICC and those
considerations of prudence that cannot be excluded consistent with common sense.
Prudence is particularly appropriate when addressing questions which could
undermine the still-fragile consensus on the Court‘s formula for complementarity
jurisdiction.
Critiques of the ICC often focus on charges of selectivity. Why are certain
situations before the Court while others are not? Why are some individuals in a
country charged and not others? Perhaps more to the point, why have all the
situations and cases so far been from the continent of Africa? These are important
questions, but it should be recalled that some degree of selectivity is inevitable.
Given the limited resources of the ICC, some of those responsible for real crimes
must necessarily escape prosecution. There will never be enough international
courtrooms to try every potential case in every potential situation within the
potential jurisdiction of the ICC. The challenge is to determine when there is an
unacceptable lack of impartiality. At the very least, the perception of selectivity
and bias against African states and their leaders has already become a problem that
is seriously undermining support for the ICC. Bland assurances of impartiality are
unlikely to improve this situation.
B. A Place for Politics: The Importance of International Institutional Prudence
The ICC was created to address the problem of impunity, and it is only right
that its judges, prosecutors, and other officials should do their utmost to achieve
that end. At the same time, the ICC and its officials should exercise and exhibit
―prudence‖ in pursuing that institution‘s mandate for international justice.
26. See M.R. Reese, Manichaeism - One of the Most Popular Religions of the Ancient
World, ANCIENT ORIGINS (Feb. 9, 2015, 12:29 AM), http://www.ancient-origins.net/history/man
ichaeism-one-most-popular-religions-ancient-world-002658 (explaining origins and concepts of
Manichaeism).
27. See Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/02/06/africa-attacks-internationalcriminal-court/ (emphasizing Africa‘s critique of ICC for their selective prosecution in Africa).
28. Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot
Win, 28 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 323, 336 (2015) (explaining that on any reasonable set of selection
criteria, persons from some groups (including well-connected groups) will be responsible for real
crimes and yet not warrant selection for prosecution.)
29. ―The question is therefore, not whether selective prosecution should occur, as it is
almost impossible that it does not, but when selective enforcement is unacceptable. Clearly,
selective enforcement would be unacceptable when there is a duty to prosecute all crimes.‖ Ovo
Imoedemhe, Unpacking the Tension Between the African Union and the International Criminal
Court: The Way Forward, 23 AFR. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 74, 78–79 (2015).
30. Allen Wiener argues forcefully that the ICC should demonstrate prudence, noting
regarding complementarity that ―in the case of the ICC in particular, prosecutors should avoid
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Although no one wants an ICC compromised by political considerations, this
does not mean that politics cannot in some legitimate way be relevant to the work
of the ICC. The ICC prides itself on its impartiality and independence, but mere
impartiality may not be enough. In particular, the Court cannot be successful if it
ignores the real and persistent sensitivities that complementarity was intended to
address and resolve.
Prudence is a term better known to philosophers, political theorists, and
foreign policy mavens than to lawyers, judges, or other international officials. The
term as it is used here refers to care, caution, and good judgment in anticipating the
long-term consequences of the Court‘s present day activities. Professor Hans
Morgenthau defined the realist virtue of prudence as ―consideration of the political
consequences of seemingly moral action [and] . . . the weighing of the
consequences of alternative political actions.‖ Prudence can be as important to
success in advancing the international rule of law as it is to success in power
politics. It would be naïve and counterproductive to ignore the dedication of states
to their own interests and perspectives.
States have legitimate rights which include the right to exercise jurisdiction
over crimes committed within their territory or by their nationals. If the ICC is to
be effective, these important sovereign rights must be carefully balanced against
the interests of global justice.
The Rome Statute negotiations aimed to create a modest institution with very
narrowly defined jurisdiction. A first and very substantial limit on the ICC resulted
from the decision to base its ordinary jurisdiction on the consent of either the
territorial state where relevant crimes have allegedly been committed or the state of
nationality of the accused. If neither of these states consents and neither is a party
to the Rome Statute, only a referral from the U.N. Security Council can establish
taking unduly aggressive positions on complementarity. Where there is a credible case that a state
is prepared to hold one of its nationals criminally accountable for crimes related to war-time
atrocities, the Court should resist the temptation to go forward with its own prosecution, even
though the Court may have invested significant investigative resources in the case. . . . But where
some credible form of justice can be done locally—even if it is not precisely the form of justice
available at the ICC—there is a danger that the Court will be seen internationally as undermining
the goals of complementarity.‖ Allen S. Weiner, Prudent Politics: The International Criminal
Court, International Relations, and Prosecutorial Independence, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 545, 559 (2013).
31. ―Paradoxically, the ICC‘s fight against impunity is a fight against politics, with the aim
of establishing individual criminal accountability before an independent court that is not
compromised by political considerations.‖ Imoedemhe, supra note 29 (citing Sarah M.H.
Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court
in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUROPEAN J. INT‘L L. 941 (2010)).
32. Even Hans Morgenthau, the ultimate proponent of realpolitik, counseled prudence as an
essential aspect of rational policymaking. ―There can be no political morality without prudence;
that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism,
then, considers prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions-to be
the supreme virtue in politics.‖ HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 12 (revised by Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton eds.,
7th ed.1992).
33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12, ¶ 2.
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ICC jurisdiction. Another major limit on the jurisdiction of the ICC is the strict
regime of complementarity, which was intended to ensure ICC deference to
national investigations or prosecutions. This limitation does not apply to cases
initiated by decision of the Security Council. The ICC itself has ―no army, no
police force, nor any power to impose economic sanctions on States.‖ From the
arrest of suspects to the production of evidence, the ICC depends entirely upon the
cooperation of States, and of the Security Council, in order to function. The
Council‘s referral to the ICC of the situations in Darfur and Libya provides clear
evidence of that dependence.
Thinking in the long term, the strength, effectiveness, and overall influence of
the ICC will be determined less by the number of persons it can charge in any
given year than by the quality of its work and its apparent legitimacy over the
years. The ICC, as an ambitious new project, must develop carefully if it is to
succeed in the long run. From this perspective, the task of the ICC today is not to
arrogate to itself the broadest possible jurisdiction, but to focus carefully and
professionally upon the most serious crimes falling within its jurisdiction. This
should be done without infringing upon the legitimate rights (including the
―residual‖ or retained jurisdiction) of States Parties to the Rome Statute. The ICC
needs to exercise prudence because it must operate within a concrete and highly
restrictive framework which has political as well as legal dimensions. An ICC
disconnected from the realities of international life could be ―impractical or even
harmful.‖
The judges of the ICC have broad discretion to interpret and apply the Rome
Statute. That is a key part of their function and role at the ICC. But to say that the
ICC, its judges, and other officials should act according to legal principle is not to

34. Id. art. 13(b).
35. The fundamental importance of complementarity to the functioning of the ICC is
discussed infra Section III.A. See also What is Complementarity?, supra note 2 (explaining the
importance and procedure of complementarity).
36. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18.
37. Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Brief Response, 31 INT‘L L. & POL. 855, 882 (1999).)
38. See Imoedemhe, supra note 29, at 75 (discussing the Security Council‘s situation
referrals).
39. See Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouten G. Wernen, Doing Justice to the Political: The
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 941, 946 (2010) (―A
sound normative assessment of the Court should be based on an acknowledgement and
understanding of the political aspects of the ICC. Defining away the ICC‘s political dimensions
eventually undermines the Court by making it look either hypocritical or utopian.‖).
40. See Robinson, supra note 28, at 326 (―A commonly-associated connotation is that,
being too unconnected to power, one lacks effectiveness, making the initiative impractical or even
harmful.‖).
41. See Artur Appazov, „Judicial Activism‟ and the International Criminal Court, (iCourts,
Working Paper Series, No. 17, 12, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566136 (describing how ICC
judges, despite the limiting language of Article 21 of the Rome Statute, take interpretive liberties
in their cases).
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say that politics and prudent policy should be irrelevant to its actions. As a
relatively new institution, the ICC is still learning to calibrate its jurisdiction
relative to that of its member states. This could prove to be a continuing challenge
for the Court.
III. DEFINING THE ICC’S BASIC JURISDICTION: INTERPRETATION, SCOPE AND
APPLICATION OF COMPLEMENTARITY/ADMISSIBILITY
A. The Concept of Complementarity and the Negotiations on the Rome Statute
ICC
Complementarity was the essential political compromise formulation in Rome
regarding the relationship between national and international criminal jurisdiction
under the Rome Statute. Without it, there would be no ICC. Developments
regarding the complementary jurisdiction of the Court in general, and in particular
the application of that standard in the Kenya cases, to be addressed below, are
cause for real concern. The basic thrust of the principle of complementarity is to
hold individual violators responsible for international crimes, without
unnecessarily undermining the sovereignty, rights and other legitimate interests of
states. As important as it was, the principle was only imperfectly rendered into
the text of the Statute.
The ad hoc international criminal tribunals that had preceded the ICC were
granted ―primacy‖ over national courts by decision of the Security Council. This
meant that these international tribunals had jurisdiction superior to that of the states
where the crimes had been committed, and that those states were required by
Security Council decision to defer to the jurisdiction of these international
tribunals. In preliminary negotiations on the Rome Statute, it became clear that
42. Sharon A. Williams, Article 17, Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OBSERTER‘S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE
613 (O. Triffterer ed., 2008).
43. Sharon Williams flatly states that complementarity is ―one of if not the cornerstone of
the Rome Statute. It strikes a balance between state sovereignty and an effective and credible
ICC. Without it there would have been no agreement.‖ Id. (internal citations omitted).
44. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Kenya vs. The ICC Prosecutor, 53 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 269,
276 (2012). As Jalloh notes: ―While discussions of the complementarity principle divided
delegates, the main impetus and implication for its inclusion was clear and predicated on
pragmatism: it would protect national sovereignty and increase the willingness of states to accept
the Court‘s jurisdiction.‖ Id.
45. See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction
of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT‘L L. 383, 394 (1998).
46. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as
adopted by the Security Council, is an Annex to the Secretary-General‘s report on the Tribunal
prepared for the Council. U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, at 36, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). The
concept of primacy has been described as follows:
The term ―primacy‖ was used in an attempt to convey a somewhat complicated notion of
jurisdictional hierarchy in which States were encouraged to assume a substantial portion of
the responsibility for the prosecution and trial of the apparently large number of perpetrators
of reported atrocities, while at the same time preserving the inherent supremacy of the
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states would not grant this sweeping primacy to a permanent ICC. Thus, a key
task in negotiating the Rome Statute was to determine exactly what the balance
would be between the ICC‘s jurisdiction and the national jurisdiction of states, and
just how such a balance could be implemented and maintained.
Fundamental elements of the complementarity formula include the
presumptive priority of national jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of the ICC (the
latter is only to complement the former); the prior right of states to investigate and,
if appropriate, prosecute any case, rendering that case inadmissible before the ICC;
and the notion that the ICC was to operate only as a ―court of last resort‖ or
failsafe mechanism with jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute a case only if and
when there was no state willing and able to do so in a genuine, unbiased, and
credible way.
The importance of complementarity is manifold but the focus here is on only
three interrelated aspects. First of all, complementarity represents the foundational
and essential compromise in negotiating the ICC Statute.
Without
complementarity, there could not have been any consensus at the 1998 Rome
Conference. Secondly, complementarity was a fundamental ―selling point‖ or
justificatory argument for the entire ICC. In this capacity, it addressed the fears of
states at the stage of negotiation and ratification regarding the possible loss of
sovereignty. Furthermore, at the stage of practical application, complementarity
was intended to act as a safeguard against ICC prosecutorial abuse by ensuring that
states could step in and prosecute crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, thereby
rendering the cases inadmissible before the ICC.
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal which may need to be asserted for various reasons in
particular cases-not in the usual sense of reviewing the decisions of ―lower‖ courts but rather
to exercise jurisdiction in the first instance as a trial court.

VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER‘S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 126 n. 378 (1995).
47. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 46, at 127.
48. Jalloh, supra note 44, at 272. ―In any event, the complementarity principle gives states a
first right to carry out investigations and prosecutions in their own courts before the ICC
jurisdiction would be triggered. That creates a presumption in their favor that should not be easily
displaced in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. If the idea of
complementarity underpinning Article 17 of the Rome Statute is to mean anything, it necessarily
implies that member states must have a degree of flexibility to exercise their discretion in
deciding whom to prosecute.‖ Id.
49. See Williams, supra note 42, at 613 (―The complementarity principle strikes a balance
between state sovereignty and an effective and credible ICC. Without it there would have been no
agreement.‖).
50. Id.
51. Jalloh, supra note 44, at 271.
52. Id. at 272. ―In any event, the complementarity principle gives states a first right to carry
out investigations and prosecutions in their own courts before the ICC jurisdiction would be
triggered. That creates a presumption in their favor that should not be easily displaced in the
absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. If the idea of complementarity underpinning
Article 17 of the Rome Statute is to mean anything, it necessarily implies that member states must
have a degree of flexibility to exercise their discretion in deciding whom to prosecute.‖ Id.
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The possibility of prosecutorial abuse was much discussed at the Rome
Conference, in part because the Statute was negotiated amidst concerns that the
ICC Prosecutor might turn out to be an international Kenneth Starr (referring to
former U.S. Whitewater Independent Counsel who relentlessly pursued
investigation and prosecution of President Bill Clinton over arguably trivial
matters ultimately focusing on sexual misconduct). Unfortunately, the ICC‘s
decisions on admissibility have thus far done nothing to allay concerns that it
might similarly extend or abuse its jurisdiction.
The Rome Statute provides that if a state pursues a case, that case will be
inadmissible before the ICC unless that state is ―unwilling or unable‖ to genuinely
prosecute the case. Accordingly, it was commonly understood at the Rome
Conference that the general rule and presumption was to favor national jurisdiction
whenever it was genuinely in play, leaving the ICC Prosecution with a clear
burden of rebutting this presumption before it could rightfully proceed.
B. The ICC in Kenya: Case Study on the Devaluation of Complementarity
1. The ICC Kenya Cases
The Kenya cases resulted from the first investigation ever to be launched
proprio motu, or under the sole discretionary authority of the ICC Prosecutor. The
cases unfolded as six political leaders from two opposing political factions in
Kenya, (the so-called ―Ocampo 6‖) were charged by the ICC with crimes against
humanity after post-electoral violence led to the death of over 1,000 people. The
government of Kenya challenged the jurisdiction of the ICC by asserting its prior
right to deal with the cases under its national law. The ICC ultimately ruled that
the cases were admissible because the government of Kenya had apparently not
taken any concrete steps towards investigating them.
The merits of the admissibility arguments in these cases will be discussed in
detail below. For now, it is sufficient to note that instead of proceeding so swiftly
with the prosecution of its own cases in Kenya, the ICC might have chosen instead
to prioritize working cooperatively with the Kenyan government to build a solid
national capacity for investigation and prosecution of the serious crimes
committed. Furthermore, the ICC was dismissive of Kenya‘s arguments against
53. See Mimi Swartz, Opinion, Ken Starr‟s Squalid Second Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/27/opinion/ken-starrs-squalid-second-act.html (stating
that Mr. Starr‘s brief on the Whitewater real estate venture expanded to investigating the sex life
of Monica Lewinski, leading to Clinton‘s soiled legacy).
54. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
55. See Jalloh, supra note 44, at 270 (―The ICC‘s involvement in Kenya began on March
31, 2010 when the Pre-Trial Chamber authorized then Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to
commence a formal investigation into the situation.‖).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/10-02/11 OA, Opinion of Judge Nsereko, ¶ 40 (Aug.
30, 2011).
59. See infra Section III.B.1.a–b.
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admissibility, at one point even refusing to allow the Kenyan government to file
additional written submissions and evidence in support of its challenge.
a. Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert’s Outspoken Critique of the ICC
Prosecution
From the very start, the ICC Prosecutor‘s office made many fundamental
errors in its management of the Kenyatta case and received scathing reviews not
only from African Union (AU) members but eventually from ICC Judge Christine
Van den Wyngaert of Belgium as well. In a concurring opinion on a procedural
matter, she identified a litany of Prosecution errors in that case. Her principal
critique was that the Prosecution had failed to investigate the case properly before
presenting it to the judges for confirmation. This, she said, resulted in an
unusually large number of witnesses being interviewed for the first time after
confirmation, by the very fact of which the Prosecution had ―violated its obligation
under article 54(1)(a) of the Statute to fully respect the rights of persons arising
from the Statute.‖
Worse still, she called out the Prosecutor for having a ―negligent attitude
towards verifying the untrustworthiness of its evidence,‖ and for ―grave problems
in the Prosecutions system of evidence review, as well as for a serious lack of
proper oversight by senior Prosecution staff.‖
From the beginning, the case against Kenyatta had been characterized as ―a
weak one based on hearsay,‖ but the ICC Prosecutor pushed on nonetheless even
as Judge Van den Wyngaert requested to withdraw from the Kenyatta case, citing
personal reasons.

60. Kenyatta, ICC-01/10-02/11 OA, at ¶¶ 47, 80–83.
61. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-728-Anx2, Concurring Opinion of Judge
Wyngaert (Apr. 26 2013). See also African Union Agrees on ICC Immunity for Heads of State,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 12, 2013, 1:51 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandind
ianocean/10374538/African-Union-agrees-on-ICC-immunity-for-heads-of-state.html (stating that
the AU called for the ICC to defer the case against Kenyatta).
62. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-728-Anx2, ¶ 1.
63. Id. ¶ 5.
64. See id. ¶ 4. ―Finally, there can be no excuse for the Prosecution‘s negligent attitude
towards verifying the untrustworthiness of its evidence. In particular, the incidents relating to
witness 4 are clearly indicative of a negligent attitude towards verifying the reliability of central
evidence in the Prosecution‘s case. . . . However, what all these explanations reveal is that there
are grave problems in the Prosecution‘s system of evidence review, as well as a serious lack of
proper oversight by senior Prosecution staff.‖ Id.
65. See Murithi Mutiga, Opinion, Fumbling Justice for Kenya, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/mutiga-fumbling-justice-for-kenya.html (―From an
early stage, prominent officials, such as the former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African
affairs, Jendayi Frazer, had warned that the Kenyatta case was a ‗weak one based on hearsay.‘‖).
66. Tome Maliti, Judges Decline to Stop Kenyatta Case, INT‘L JUST. MONITOR,
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/judges-decline-to-stop-kenyatta-case-part-2/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2017).
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b. The Collapse of the Kenya Cases
The ICC proceedings became so unpopular in Kenya that two of those
charged used anti-ICC rhetoric as a campaign vehicle. It worked so well that one
of them, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, was elected President of Kenya, and another,
William Samoei Ruto, who had previously been Kenyatta‘s ethnic and political
adversary, was elected Vice President. Once they took office, the cases against
them would languish. Widespread problems with witness intimidation and threats
of violence and bribery by the government, both directly and indirectly, led to
charges being dropped early against many of the Ocampo 6, and ultimately, the
case against Kenyatta collapsed when the ICC Trial Chamber ordered the Office of
the Prosecutor to dismiss the case unless it was ready to present its case against
him. All charges against Kenyatta were then withdrawn, and the ICC was very
publicly humiliated. The case against the still-sitting Vice President Ruto was also
eventually dropped, leaving the ICC Prosecutor‘s Office with nothing to show for
its years of effort in Kenya except for a few residual witness-tampering cases.
The international community will not soon forget this debacle, nor should it.
The Kenya cases revealed some very fundamental problems with the ICC and the
lessons of this experience should be heeded. The ICC had failed spectacularly in its
mission to convict, but the damage done went far beyond the ICC‘s tarnished
image. There were real people who suffered from the ICC‘s botched efforts in
Kenya. After the ICC effectively withdrew from Kenya, many of the victims,
witnesses, and others who had supported the Court‘s efforts faced persecution. In
an interview, former ICC Prosecutor Ocampo expressed remorse about the fate of
those the ICC Kenya cases left behind.
67. Michela Wrong, Indictee for President!, N.Y. TIMES: LATITUDE (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/being-prosecuted-by-the-i-c-c-helped-uhuru-kenyat
tas-chances-in-kenyas-election/.
68. Id.
69. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC_01/09-01/11, Decision on Defence Applications for
Judgments of Acquittal, 118 (Apr. 5, 2016) (specifically citing online intimidation and releasing
witnesses‘ identities).
70. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-1005, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges
against Mr. Kenyatta, ¶ 3 (Mar. 13, 2015).
71. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC_01/09-02/11-983, Notice of Withdrawal of the Charges
against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014).
72. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, at 118.
73. See Verini, supra note 21 (discussing incidences of violence toward individuals who
experience violence by those who tried to banish the ICC from Africa).
74. See id. (interviewing former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo)
In Vienna, I told Moreno-Ocampo about Eric, the man attacked by Mungiki in his home. The
day after the attack, Eric woke up in a Nakuru hospital to find that half of his left arm had
been amputated. . . . Police officers rushed to their home and took the family to the hospital,
where they lived for weeks, because it was too dangerous to leave.
They traveled across the country to the home of Eric‘s mother, who still supports them. Eric
can‘t find work. Hoping for some compensation, he joined the case against Kenyatta. I asked
him what he thought when he learned the case had been withdrawn. ―I have not seen any
justice,‖ he said.
The second time I saw Moreno-Ocampo express remorse was when I told him this.
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Part of the problem with all the Kenya cases can certainly be attributed to the
Kenyan government‘s failure to cooperate with the ICC. Initially, both Kenyatta
and Ruto attempted to avoid a direct confrontation with the ICC, and they appeared
voluntarily when required to do so by the Court, even while challenging its
jurisdiction. Kenyan President Kenyatta and Vice-President Ruto personally
appeared before the ICC when formally required. After all, Kenya is a state party
to the Rome Statute, and is therefore subject to the duty to cooperate with the
ICC. This is understood to mean that each State Party must comply with the
court‘s decisions, orders, and requests. As the cases moved forward, the Kenyan
government‘s attitude hardened, after which it failed to provide access to
documentation and witnesses requested by the ICC. This basically made it
impossible to collect any more evidence from within Kenya, and was fatal because
the pre-confirmation investigations had been inadequate.

―It‘s awful,‖ he said, his face dropping. ―I remember a lady in [Kenya] who, the only hope for
her was us. And now I imagine how bad she felt. That I feel badly about.‖

Id.
75. See Wahome Thuku, Kenya‟s President Uhuru Kenyatta owns no land: ICC told,
STANDARD DIGITAL (July 10, 2014), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000127656/kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-owns-no-land-icc-told. ―It was a stormy session at the International
Criminal Court (ICC) as the prosecution locked horns with the Kenya Government over alleged
failure to co-operate in the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta. The Office of the Prosecution
accused the Government of failing to provide substantial, personal information touching on
President Kenyatta, including his business and political associates. But the Government, led by
Attorney General Githu Muigai, rebutted, accusing the prosecution of providing vague requests
that could not be acted on.‖ Id.
76. See ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta charges for Kenya ethnic violence, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019 (explaining Kenyatta‘s and Ruto‘s
contempt for the ICC when Ruto‘s case was still before the Court).
77. See Kenyatta Appears before ICC Court, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.aljaze
era.com/news/africa/2014/10/kenyatta-netherlands-hague-face-icc-charges201410802514574650.html (explaining that Kenyatta handed power over to his Deputy to appear
before the ICC); Faith Karimi & Laura Smith-Spark, William Ruto, Kenya‟s Deputy leader, On
Trial for Alleged Crimes Against Humanity, CNN (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.cnn.c
om/2013/09/10/world/africa/kenya-icc-trial/ (stating that Ruto faced trial before the ICC).
78. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86. This article on the general obligation to cooperate
provides that ―[s]tates Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court.‖ Id.
79. Marlise Simons & Jeffrey Gettleman, International Criminal Court Drops Case Against
Kenya‟s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/af
rica/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html.
The Kenyan cases highlight the difficulties in bringing to justice senior officials who have
been charged with atrocities, and underscore what specialists call the Achilles‘ heel of the
court: its dependence on cooperation from governments. With no enforcement agency at its
disposal, it cannot execute arrest warrants, get access to crime scenes or search official
records without the cooperation of the national authorities.

Id.
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2. The Devaluation of Complementarity in the Kenya Cases
Article 17 of the Rome Statute expresses the general rule that the ICC should
find any case to be inadmissible where the case is being investigated by a State
Party or has been investigated by a State Party that has decided not to prosecute.
The only exceptions to this general rule apply if the state party concerned is
unwilling or unable genuinely to prosecute the case, or if there is a situation of
inactivity, i.e., if there is no national investigation or prosecution of the case
concerned. If these exceptions are applied too broadly, and if the specific case is
defined too narrowly, the effect will be eventually to undermine the basic principle
of complementarity, and the fundamental safeguard it was to provide for legitimate
state interests.
a. The Appeals Chamber Ruling on the State Admissibility Challenge
In an important 2011 judgment, the ICC Appeals Chamber did much to
clarify the Court‘s standards governing admissibility and complementarity. The
judgment was rendered after the ICC Prosecutor, acting proprio motu, initiated an
investigation into the situation in Kenya and the Pre-Trial Chamber issued
summonses in multiple cases. The government of Kenya was the first state ever to
challenge the Court‘s determination of admissibility on appeal under the ICC
Statute. A careful examination of that judgment reveals how, in practice,
complementarity has been rendered useless as a safeguard against prosecutorial
excess.
Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber modified and reaffirmed its previously
stated formula, which holds that ―for such a case to be inadmissible under article
17 (1) (a) of the Statute, the national investigation must cover the same individual
and substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the
Court.‖ The Court then affirmed that an admissibility challenge was needed only
when there was a jurisdictional conflict, but that there was no such conflict
between the ICC and Kenya because, in the Court‘s view, there had been no
Kenyan investigation or prosecution.
The Appeals Chamber conceded that the Statute does favor domestic
proceedings, but it nonetheless concluded that admissibility proceedings under
Article 17 must focus only on whether there actually are, or have been, genuine
investigations and/or prosecutions at the national level. The Appeals Chamber
further ruled that it has no discretion to consider any additional factors in those

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
Id. art. 17(1)(a)–(b).
Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Judgment, ¶ 67 (Aug. 30, 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 43.
Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, at ¶ 44.
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proceedings. In concrete terms, this precluded any consideration of the Kenyan
government‘s detailed plans to establish a new special court to address the
situation.
Perhaps most troubling, the Appeals Chamber notes without comment the
Prosecution‘s argument that it is quite possible ―for the Court and the relevant state
to concurrently exercise jurisdiction over different suspects for crimes arising out
of the same events.‖ If this ―possibility‖ becomes the rule, it will endow the ICC
with functionally parallel and largely independent jurisdiction equal to that of ICC
States Parties. Such a result would stand the concept of complementarity on its
head.
b. Judge Anita Ušacka’s Dissent on Admissibility
One ICC Appeals Judge, Anita Ušacka from Latvia strongly dissented from
the Appeals Chamber‘s rulings on admissibility and complementarity. The Judge
stressed that a State Party admissibility challenge is not a criminal proceeding as
such. Her opinion, unlike that of the majority, stresses that these challenges raise
issues of state sovereignty, a concept that the majority decision largely avoids.
She then notes that complementarity, as a ―core guiding principle‖ of the ICC,

89. As the Appeals Chamber noted:
Kenya also argues that there should be a ―leaway [sic] in the exercise of discretion in the
application of the principle of complementarity‖ to allow domestic proceedings to progress.
This argument has no merit because, as explained above, the purpose of the admissibility
proceedings under article 19 of the Statute is to determine whether the case brought by the
Prosecutor is inadmissible because of a jurisdictional conflict. Unless there is such a conflict,
the case is admissible. The suggestion that there should be a presumption in favour of
domestic jurisdictions does not contradict this conclusion. Although article 17 (1) (a) to (c) of
the Statute does indeed favour national jurisdictions, it does so only to the extent that there
actually are, or have been, investigations and/or prosecutions at the national level. If the
suspect or conduct have not been investigated by the national jurisdiction, there is no legal
basis for the Court to find the case inadmissible.

Id. ¶ 44 (footnotes omitted).
90. See id. ¶ 125 (holding the ICC will hear the case).
91. Id. ¶ 32.
92. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ušacka (Sept.
20, 2011).
93. Judge Ušacka states:
Proceedings under article 19 of the Statute are . . . not criminal proceedings, but
proceedings of their own kind, primarily serving the purpose of resolving conflicts of
jurisdiction.
....
[I]n proceedings under article 19 (2) (b), the State‘s right to investigate and prosecute a case
itself, which forms the basis of the principle of complementarity, is immediately at issue.

Id. ¶¶ 16, 18 (emphasis added).
94. A search of the Appeals Chamber Judgment found only a single reference to
―sovereign‖ rights or ―sovereignty‖ in the entire judgment of twenty-seven pages. In contrast,
Judge Ušacka‘s shorter (eighteen pages) Dissenting Opinion (including footnotes) mentions these
terms eleven times. Id; Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA.

_31.1_BARTRAM BROWN_ ARTICLE 9 (DO NOT DELETE)

162

4/21/2017 3:17 PM

TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L.J.

[31.1

calls for reconciling the sovereignty of the state with the interests of global
justice.
In her view, it is to accommodate these sovereign rights that the ICC rules
provide for a version of ―due process‖ for States Parties, the details of which will
develop over time. Her concern seems to be that the majority‘s narrow and rigid
approach to admissibility challenges may preclude this type of gradual and organic
development.
Judge Ušacka criticized the Trial Chamber for setting the procedure ―merely
according to procedural minimum requirements,‖ and for rejecting reasonable
efforts by Kenya to add to this procedure by, for example, presenting some of its
arguments in an oral hearing, and/or by the submission of additional legal briefs as
it had requested. A key theme of Judge Ušacka‘s dissent is that the Pre-Trial
Chamber, in its rush to decide the admissibility challenge, ―did not sufficiently
take into account‖ that it was called upon to address many new, unresolved yet
pivotal issues such as the definition of ―investigation‖ and ―prosecution.‖ Overemphasis on the need to expedite the proceedings led the Chamber to deny
Kenya‘s request for a hearing on these and other unresolved issues and not to seek
specific submissions from the litigants on these crucial issues.
Hers is a telling critique of the majority judgment. At the very moment when
a careful approach to complementarity was most required, the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber had instead plowed ahead and ruled precipitously on a range of difficult
and sensitive issues raised by the admissibility challenge, all within less than a few
months after the issuance of the initial summons to appear. On top of all this, the
Prosecutor‘s Office was not prepared to make its case when the time came to do
so.
c. From Complementarity to the Effective Primacy of the ICC
The ―same person‖ and the ―same conduct‖ test favors the ICC by narrowly

95. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ušacka, ¶ 19.
That complementarity is a core guiding principle for the relationship between States and the
Court is confirmed by its prominent place in the Statute (article 1 and Preamble) as well as by the
drafting history of the Rome Statute . . . . Complementarity reinforces the principle of
international law that it is the sovereign right of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction;
but it also ensures that the Court can step in to give effect to the goals of international criminal
justice.
Id. ¶ 18.
96. Id. ¶ 22.
97. Id. ¶ 24.
98. Id. ¶ 25.
99. Id. ¶ 28.
100. See id. (―The Admissibility Challenge was rejected within eight weeks of the date of
filing. The period between the issuance of the decision summoning the persons in question and
the Impugned Decision did not even amount to three months.‖).
101. See supra Section III.B.1.a–b, especially footnotes 60, 64, 70, and 71 and
accompanying text.
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defining each ―case.‖ Thus, in theory, even if the same accused is already being
prosecuted by a State Party, the ICC can still concurrently charge and prosecute
that person for different specific acts of a similar nature, as this would constitute a
separate and therefore admissible case. Any state hoping to claw back to its
national courts a case already initiated by the ICC would need carefully to mirror
the ICC‘s charges in exercising this right, citing the very same persons and conduct
addressed by the ICC. If there was any discrepancy between them, the case under
national law would not render the ICC case inadmissible. This standard radically
alters the balance of national to international jurisdiction that is at the heart of
complementarity, and indeed, at the very heart of the consensus at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference.
That safeguard function of complementarity has been neutralized by the shift
towards the effective primacy of the ICC over national jurisdictions. Primacy, the
priority of international jurisdiction over national jurisdiction (as known to the
previous ad hoc international criminal tribunals), was specifically rejected in the
ICC treaty negotiations, to be replaced by complementarity. Clearly then, the
Rome Statute‘s rules on admissibility should not be interpreted and applied so as to
effectively transform the court‘s limited complementary jurisdiction into primacy
over the jurisdiction of national courts. An ICC with primacy would probably be
more effective than an ICC with only complementary jurisdiction, but this is not
what was agreed to in the Rome Statute. The judges of the ICC, by judicial
interpretation, clearly seem to have granted the ICC greater authority than was
agreed to by states at the Rome Conference.
Having ruled so broadly, decisively, and precipitously on the legal and
technical aspects of admissibility, the ICC is now faced with a political problem.
The Court‘s prevailing standard of admissibility is inconsistent with the true
consensus on the basic concept of complementarity, and until this has been
corrected, it will be difficult to restore the perceived legitimacy and credibility of
the ICC. How can the effectiveness of the ICC be enhanced for the future given the
cross-cutting pressures which threaten to undermine its support and even its
continued existence? Prudence, and greater fidelity to the Rome consensus on
complementarity, will be essential.

102. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Judgment, ¶ 40 (Aug. 30, 2011).
103. Brown, supra note 45, at 423–27.
104. See Jalloh, supra note 44 (―By taking jurisdiction under the current framework, the
appeals court seems to continue the logic of accountability in a purposive way which is laudable,
although some might see this as taking it beyond what states would have initially anticipated as
the proper role of ICC during the Rome Conference.‖).
105. Jalloh, supra note 44, at 272. Jalloh points out, ―[i]f the idea of complementarity
underpinning Article 17 of the Rome Statute is to mean anything, it necessarily implies that
member states must have a degree of flexibility to exercise their discretion in deciding whom to
prosecute.‖ Id.
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IV. AFRICA AND THE ICC
At the end of the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, African States
overwhelmingly endorsed the Rome Statute, and to this day there are more ICC
States Parties from Africa than from any other single region. African support for
the ICC was evident when the ICC‘s first case was a ―self-referral‖ in which the
government of Uganda invited the ICC onto its own territory to investigate and
prosecute the Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader Joseph Kony. Before
that happened, few had anticipated the possibility. It had been assumed that no
state would ever favor ICC jurisdiction over that of its own national courts. Thus,
the self-referral was an African (and Ugandan) innovation, which was soon
followed by other African States. Thus far, the ICC has achieved its greatest
successes in cases based on self-referrals.
More recently, however, the ICC‘s working relationship with African States
has deteriorated. The debilitating tension between Africa and the ICC began when
the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, and an arrest

106. See Verini, supra note 21.
When the court was formed, it was, one observer wrote, ―an international epiphany.‖ It was
also, it seemed, a great moment for Africa. Senegal was the first country to ratify the court‘s
founding treaty, the Rome Statute. Archbishop Desmond Tutu called the I.C.C. ―Africa‘s
court.‖ Today, 34 of the court‘s 124 member states are African, the largest contingent after
Europe‘s.

Id.
107. The Solicitor General of Uganda explained, as summarized by the ICC‘s Pre-Trial
Chamber that:
[W]hilst the national judicial system of Uganda was ―widely recognised for its fairness,
impartiality, and effectiveness‘, it was the Government‘s view that the Court was ―the most
appropriate and effective forum for the investigation and prosecution of those bearing the
greatest responsibility for the crimes within the referred situation‖. This view was based on
several considerations, including (i) the scale and gravity of the relevant crimes; (ii) the fact
that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court would be of immense benefit for the victims of
these crimes and contribute favourably to national reconciliation and social rehabilitation; (iii)
Uganda‘s inability to arrest the persons who might bear the greatest responsibility for the
relevant crimes.

Prosecutor v. Kony ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Under
Article 19(1) of the Statute, ¶ 37 (Mar. 10. 2009).
108. See Nouwen & Werner, supra note 39, at 947–48.
The Ugandan government triggered the Court‘s jurisdiction in a way which is provided for in
the Rome Statute, a referral by a state party, but few at the Rome Conference had anticipated
that a state would refer to the Court a situation on its own territory and concerning its own
nationals. The debate had focused on how states could prevent ICC intervention. It had been
assumed that states would consider such intervention as costly to their sovereignty and
reputation.

Id.
109. In addition to Uganda, several other African states have self-referred situations on their
territory to the ICC, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and the Central
African Republic (twice). See Situations Under Investigation, INT‘L CRIMINAL COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (listing situations
currently under investigation in the ICC).
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warrant was issued for Sudanese President Al Bashir. Today, the tension grows
primarily from two sources: 1) the fact that the ICC has charged sitting African
heads of state, and 2) a dispute over the interpretation and implementation of
complementarity in Africa.
A. The AU Challenge to the Legitimacy of the ICC
As the South African government, formerly one the ICC‘s strongest
supporters in Africa, was preparing to host a Summit meeting of AU national
leaders in 2015, trouble was on the horizon. Sudanese President Al-Bashir wanted
to attend this meeting, but the ICC had issued a warrant for his arrest for crimes
against humanity and genocide. The EU weighed in before the AU summit,
issuing a statement that EU states expected South Africa to arrest Al-Bashir if he
showed up in South Africa. In the end, the government of South Africa decided
to ignore its legal obligation to execute the ICC arrest warrant against Al-Bashir.
In deference to notions of anti-colonialism and of African regional solidarity, a
decision by the South African Courts that he should be arrested was also ignored.
The damage done to the ICC‘s reputation for legitimacy was readily apparent.
As the ICC continues to focus on Africa, seemingly to the exclusion of other
continents, it feeds the perception that Africa is being made a scapegoat as the guilt

110. Imoedemhe, supra note 29, at 75.
Relations between the ICC and the African Union (AU) deteriorated from cooperation to
conflict following the indictment of President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir of Sudan for
crimes against humanity and genocide. The basis for the tension seems to have been the
involvement of the United Nations Security Council . . . in the referral of the situation in
Darfur, Sudan to the ICC and its subsequent refusal to defer the case, as requested by the AU.

Id.
111. Id. at 91.
Arguably, the current hostility between the ICC and the AU stems from new legal principles
whose interpretations and implications remain unclear, though they are evolving.
Fundamental to this ambiguity is the interpretation and implementation of
complementarity, the application of which, as a mutually inclusive concept, would involve
both national authorities and the ICC equally sharing the responsibility of prosecuting
international crimes.

Id. at 91 (emphasis added) (citing Mohammed El Zeidy, The Genesis of Complementarity, in 1
COMPLEMENTARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
(Carsten Stahn & Mohammed El Zeidy eds., 2011)).
112. Norimitsu Onishi, Omar al-Bashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/omar-hassan-albashir-sudan-south-africa.html.
113. See Statement, Statement by Spokesperson on South Africa and the International
Criminal Court (June 14, 2015), http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150614_02_en.htm
(emphasizing both EU support for ICC and expectation that South Africa will comply with
executing outstanding arrest warrants within territory).
Id.
114. Onishi, supra note 112.
115. Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev. v. S. Africa Litig. Centre 2016 (3) SA 317
(SCA) at 74 (S. Afr.).
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of the world is symbolically transferred to that continent, or that perhaps Africa
is being used as a test laboratory for the new institutions of international criminal
law. The AU has pushed back against the ICC in various ways, such as by
opposing the prosecution of sitting African heads of State, requesting the
suspension of proceedings against Sudanese President Al Bashir, calling upon AU
members not to arrest and surrender him to the ICC, and suggesting that African
states should withdraw from the ICC.
Miscues in the Kenya cases have undermined international confidence in the
ICC as Kenya itself went from one of the ICC‘s biggest supporters in Africa to one
of its biggest opponents. The exercise of greater prudence might have precluded
the development of this problem.
In February 2016, the AU Summit adopted a proposal from President
Kenyatta to give the Committee of African Ministers on the ICC ―a new mandate
to develop a roadmap for withdrawal from the Rome Statute as necessary.‖ This
was a far cry from all the AU countries agreeing to withdraw from the ICC as had
been feared, and some observers were even encouraged that Kenyatta seemed to

116. Imoedemhe, supra note 29, at 78–79 (citing JAMES FRAZER & ROBERT FRAZER, THE
GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION 557 (Oxford University Press, reissued ed.,
2009).
117. Id. at 82. ―[T]he ICC starts with Africans in order to cut its teeth before promising to
sink its talons on bigger prey.‖ Id. at 82 (citing Edwin Bikundo, The International Criminal Court
and Africa: Exemplary Justice, 23 L. & CRITIQUE 21, 23 (2012).
118. ―The African Union, however, has continually opposed the prosecution by the ICC of
heads of states during their term of office. The AU has requested the suspension of proceedings
against President Bashir and called upon AU members not to arrest and surrender him.‖ Miša
Zgonec-Rožej, Bashir Flight Leaves ICC in Stalemate, CHATHAM HOUSE (June 26, 2015),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/bashir-flight-leaves-icc-stalemate.
119. Neil MacFarquhar & Marlise Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/world/africa/06sudan.html?rref=col
lection%2Ftimestopic%2FInternational%20Criminal%20Court. ―Sudan called on the 30 members
of the 53-member African Union who have joined the I.C.C. to withdraw, with the country‘s
United Nations ambassador, Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem, saying the court represented ‗the
same Euro-American justice that destroyed Iraq, Afghanistan and most recently Gaza.‘‖ Id.
120. Mehari Taddele Maru, Opinion, The Future of the ICC and Africa: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/f
uture-icc-africa-good-bad-ugly-20131011143130881924.html.
[D]uring the negotiation for the Rome Statute, it was Kenya and Uganda who were the most
aggressive African proponents of the ICC. They were the first countries to ratify the Statute.
Actually, a Kenyan diplomat even assumed responsibility as the second vice presidency of the
ICC Assembly of States Parties. Before the indictments against Kenyans, the Nairobi
government was a very vocal supporter of the ICC. Now, Kenya has [announced it its
intention to] become the first country to officially withdraw from the Rome Statute. While
Kenya is once again vigorously engaged with the ICC, on this occasion it is with
determination to weaken the ICC‘s position in Africa.

Id.
121. Peter Fabricius, Follow Me, I‟m Right behind You, Says Kenyatta, INST. FOR SEC.
STUD. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/follow-me-im-right-behind-you-sayskenyatta.
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suggest that his preference was reforming the ICC, not leaving it. In any case,
only individual states are parties to the Rome Statute, and African states would
have to withdraw from the ICC individually, if at all.
Initially, only three African States, Kenya, Burundi, and Gambia, formally
moved to withdraw from the ICC. Even as those three withdrew, many other
African states reaffirmed their support for the ICC. More recently, a South
African High Court ruled on the withdrawal and declared it ―unconstitutional and
invalid,‖ which caused South Africa to join Gambia in deciding to revoke its
decision to withdraw. However, it remains to be seen if momentum towards an
AU approved mass exit from the ICC is growing or subsiding.
It is ironic that AU states threaten mass withdrawal from the ICC even as they
simultaneously contemplate implementing further measures of regional integration,
such as a common African passport. In any case, an en masse withdrawal of
African states from the ICC would be tragic, because Africa needs the ICC, just as
the ICC needs to regain the support of Africa. An AU official recently
122. Id.
The rest of his [Kenyatta‘s] speech makes clear that withdrawal from the ICC would be
conditional on the court failing to meet the AU‘s demands. As Kenyatta said earlier in his
speech: ―It is my sincere hope that our ICC reform agenda will succeed so that we can return
to the instrument we signed up for. If it does not, I believe its utility for this continent at this
moment of global turmoil will be extremely limited.‖

Id.
123. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 127 (―A State Party may, by written notification
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute.‖).
124. AP Explains: Why African states have started leaving the ICC, supra note 5.
125. See Sarah Rayzl Lansky, Africans Speak Out Against ICC Withdrawal: Governments
Signal Continued Support for Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/ne
ws/2016/11/02/africans-speak-out-against-icc-withdrawal (noting that officials from Côte
d‘Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana all continued
to support the ICC despite the decisions by three African states to withdraw from it).
126. Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal
Court, N.Y. TIMES, (March 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/southafrica-icc-withdrawal.html?_r=0
127. See Elise Keppler, Dispatches: Governments Defend ICC at African Union Summit,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 20, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/print/292277 (reporting on the most
recent AU Summit). ―The 27th African Union (AU) summit closed Monday evening without an
AU call for immediate mass withdrawal from the International Criminal Court in the face of
strong pushback from Nigeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, and even ICC non-member Algeria,
media reports and observers said.‖ Id.
128. See Anne Frugé, The Opposite of Brexit: African Union Launches an All-Africa
Passport, WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2016/07/01/the-opposite-of-brexit-african-union-launches-an-all-africa-passport/. (―On June 13,
two weeks before the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, the African Union
announced a new ‗single African passport.‘. . . say[ing] it will boost the continent‘s
socioeconomic development because it will reduce trade barriers and allow people, ideas, goods,
services and capital to flow more freely across borders.‖).
129. Maru, supra note 120.
To be certain, an en masse withdrawal from the ICC will hurt Africans more than the ICC.
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formulated a few basic critiques of the ICC as justification for a proposed African
exit from the ICC. He stressed in particular that the ICC was intended to act as a
―court of last resort,‖ but had in practice assumed the position as a ―first and last
window for justice.‖ He also criticized the fact that the U.N. Security Council
makes referrals to the ICC, even though the majority of the Council‘s Permanent
Members are not themselves parties to the ICC. After complaining that the ICC
was, in general, undermining State sovereignty, he also criticized the Security
Council for failure to acknowledge or respond to correspondence from African
states complaining about the ICC.
Many African critiques of the ICC are effectively addressed to the U.N.
Security Council, not to the ICC itself. The Council, with its referrals so far of the
situations in Sudan and in Libya, has been more focused on Africa than has been
the ICC. A key part of the African ICC critique seems to be that the Security
Council uses the Court as a neo-colonial instrument of domination against Africa
and African leaders, but blaming the problem on the ICC might not be justified.
It is worthwhile to remember that the Security Council‘s authority to establish an
international criminal tribunal was affirmed by decision of the International
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber years
before the negotiation of the Rome Statute.
On the other hand, the AU critique of the ICC‘s jurisdictional overreach is
entirely justified. It is undeniable that, under the principle of complementarity as it
was generally understood at the Rome Conference, the ICC was supposed to be a
court of last resort which would prosecute cases only when truly necessary to
With the highest incidence of systemic and human rights violations globally, Africa, more
than any other continent, needs the ICC. As the largest bloc to ratify the ICC Rome Statute,
Africa showed its staunch support for the ICC. Indeed, many Africans genuinely believe that
they want an end to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC can help in
deterring political forces from committing these terrible crimes. That is the reason why onethird (34) of the 122 states parties to the Rome Statute are member states of the African
Union. The ICC also needs Africa.

Id.
130. African Union Representative Rebukes International Court for Disproportionate Focus
on Africa, SAHARA REPORTERS (AUG. 6, 2016), http://saharareporters.com/2016/08/06/africanunion-representative-rebukes-international-court-disproportionate-focus-africa (―Joseph Chilenge,
the presiding officer of the African Union‘s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)
today said African countries were weighing a massive withdrawal from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) because the judicial system was dysfunctional. Mr. Chilenge made the submission
while speaking at an event organized by the Center for Peace and Media Initiative (CPMI) in
New York to discuss the proposed withdrawal of African countries from the International
Criminal Court.‖).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Imoedemhe, supra note 29, at 92.
135. Id. at 82.
136. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 28–40 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995) (confirming
Security Council‘s ability to pursue measures beyond use of armed force under Chapter VII).
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supplement the jurisdiction of national courts. As discussed above, judicial
interpretation has drastically narrowed the practical possibility that an ICC case
might be held inadmissible due to conflict with a national prosecution.
The critique that the ICC is biased and neo-colonial could be a matter of
perspective, but there is no doubt that those African heads of state charged with
crimes were offended when Western governments began to treat them like
criminals. It is unclear just how much popular support there is in Africa for the
anti-ICC initiatives of certain African leaders, but colonial sensitivities cannot be
completely ignored.
African heads of state dominate the AU, an organization known for
prioritizing the rights and interests of African national leaders above those of
ordinary Africans, and they contend ―that no sitting head of state should be
prosecuted.‖ Many of these same African national leaders also tend to stay in
power for a long time, and peaceful transitions of power are not the norm. Thus,
any change in the Rome Statute to allow the immunity of sitting African heads of
state could effectively shield African leaders from accountability even for the most
heinous of international crimes. This would cloak impunity in the guise of law
and would not serve the interests of justice at the national, regional or global level.
The Rome Statute makes it clear that no immunity is to apply based on
official status, and the Court cannot compromise on this issue now. But the Court
can and should learn to demonstrate more respect for national legal systems. One
way to do that is by stressing cooperative positive complementarity over the more
confrontational and adversarial negative complementarity.

137. See David Wmere & Ibrahim Oruko, Back Off, Kenya Tells EU Envoy, THE STAR,
KENYA (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/02/12/back-off-kenya-tells-euenvoy_c737685 (quoting Foreign Affairs Minister Prof Sam Ongeri‘s demands that European
ambassadors refrain from commenting on Kenyan election matters); see also, Wrong, supra note
67 (reporting Kenyan government officials were offended by disparate treatment for ICC
indictees).
138. See Norimitsu Onishi, Omar al-Bashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/omar-hassan-albashir-sudan-south-africa.html (―The African Union, which represents the continent‘s
governments, has campaigned heavily against the court, contending that no sitting head of state
should be prosecuted. . . . Critics have long asserted that the African Union is an organization
whose principal objective is to protect African leaders instead of the rights of its citizens.‖).
139. Sewell Chan, Madeleine Kruhly & Hannah Olivennes, Yoweri Museveni and Other
African „Presidents for Life‟, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/
world/europe/yoweri-museveni-and-other-african-presidents-for-life.html.
140. Rep. of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC Assembly of State Parties,
Thirteenth Session, Dec. 8–17, 2014, at 2, 3, 16, ICC-ASP/13/31 (Dec. 7, 2014) (calling for an
immunity amendment to Article 27 of the Rome State). See also African Union, Assembly Doc.
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 2013), Decision on Africa‟s Relationship with the Criminal Court
(ICC) (Oct. 12 2013) (presenting grievances and proposing solutions to Africa‘s relationship with
the ICC, including active head of state immunity).
141. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27 (establishing irrelevance of official capacity).
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B. The Need to Pivot from Adversarial Admissibility Challenges towards
Cooperation and Positive Complementarity
Efforts to balance the jurisdiction of the ICC and that of its States Parties have
also been complicated by the mistaken view that a state admissibility challenge is
somehow not an adversarial procedure. ICC Prosecutor Bensouda once asserted
that ―[t]he relationship between the Office of the Prosecutor and national
prosecuting authorities – whether civilian or military – is not adversarial.‖ While
this might be true in some situations, especially those involving cooperative
―positive complementarity,‖ it ceases to be true whenever a state has challenged
the admissibility of an ICC case. A state admissibility challenge is by its very
nature an adversarial proceeding.
If the ICC Prosecutor and the national authorities are engaged in an adversary
proceeding, then the rights and legitimate interests of states are at issue, including
their residual sovereignty. As noted above, ICC Appeals Judge Anita Ušacka‘s
dissenting opinion on admissibility repeatedly stressed that complementarity calls
for reconciling the sovereignty of the state with the interests of global justice,
while the Appeals Chamber majority failed to address, or even discuss, the issue of
state sovereignty. It is not surprising that both the ICC Appeals Chamber and the
Prosecutor are more comfortable with adversarial criminal proceedings against
individuals than they are with adversarial clashes with states concerning their
rights as such. Regardless, negative complementarity necessarily entails the right
of states to litigate these sensitive issues.
At its core, negative complementarity involves the ICC‘s critical evaluation of
national criminal proceedings to determine if the state concerned is not genuinely
proceeding to investigate or prosecute or is unwilling or unable to so proceed. If, as
in the Kenya cases, the ICC determines that no genuine national prosecution is in
place, then individual cases will be admissible before the ICC. Negative
complementarity is thus essentially an adversarial zero-sum game in which the
ICC and the state concerned compete to exercise their jurisdiction over overall
situations and individual cases.
Positive complementarity is a cooperative and positive-sum process in which
the Court, States Parties, international organizations, civil society organizations,
and other stakeholders can all help national states to enhance their capacity to
prosecute serious international crimes. In this way, credible and effective trials
could, in the best-case scenario, be held at the national level. Such an ideal result

142. Gross, supra note 25. Fatou Bensouda tells Haaretz that ―[t]he relationship between the
Office of the Prosecutor and national prosecuting authorities – whether civilian or military – is
not adversarial. On the contrary, it is complementary. The role of the Office is not to challenge
the work of national investigators and prosecutors; it supports their work as long as it is genuine
and meets other requirements stipulated by the Rome Statute.‖ Id.
143. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ušacka ¶ 18
(Sept. 20, 2011).
144. See supra Section III.B.2.b.
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will likely be difficult to realize in practice. Nonetheless, if it can be made to work,
positive complementarity promises a win both for those who are concerned about
respect for state sovereignty and for those who prioritize the interests of global
justice. Making positive complementarity work takes time and patience. Perhaps
that is why the ICC seems more focused on negative complementarity.
Is positive complementarity too passive, too slow, or too uncertain? How
patient should the Court be with national justice systems, and what about
deadlines? These questions are all relevant and none are easily answered. It seems
clear in any case that the ICC Prosecutor has a lot of discretion in determining the
Court‘s relative focus on positive versus negative complementarity. Perhaps this
focus should be readjusted as part of a general recalibration of complementarity.
Vast sums have no doubt already been spent on programs, seminars, and trainings
related to positive complementarity, but so far there are no high-profile success
stories to show for it.
V. THE BREXIT PHENOMENON AND THE ICC: OPTIONS FOR AFRICA
Viewed in broader context, the UK‘s 2016 Brexit decision was not an isolated
event but rather was symptomatic of a global political trend of popular distrust
towards power structures and elites, both national and international. An early
sign of this trend was the surge in support for eurosceptic and far-right parties in
the 2014 European Parliament elections, after which even staunchly pro-EU
politicians conceded that the EU had become ―remote and incomprehensible‖ and
needed to reform and scale back its power. The U.K. Brexit vote followed in
2016. The surprise election of political outsider Donald Trump as President of
the United States reflected this same anti-elite mindset. Another recent example
was the result of the October 2, 2016 referendum in Colombia that rejected a
carefully negotiated peace deal intended to end fifty-two years of civil war with
FARC rebels. The lesson of Brexit, as applied to the ICC, is that attempts to
maximize the jurisdiction of the ICC through the devaluation of complementarity
145. Gross, supra note 25.
146. See Kevin Casas-Zamora, Some Lessons from Brexit, DIALOGUE (July 1, 2016),
http://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2016/07/some-lessons-from-brexit/ (―Brexit is not an isolated
event. It is, rather, the most powerful example, so far, of the deep contempt towards elites and
traditional political structures, which haunts all democracies.‖).
147. EU Election: France‟s Hollande calls for reform of „remote‟ EU, BBC NEWS (May
27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27579235. ―Speaking on French TV, Mr
Hollande - a leading champion of the EU - said the project had become ‗remote and
incomprehensible,‘ and that that had to change. ‗Europe has to be simple, clear, to be effective
where it is needed and to withdraw from where it is not necessary,‘ he said.‖ Id.
148. Casas-Zamora, supra note 146.
149. See Katherine J. Cramer, For years, I‟ve been watching anti-elite fury build in
Wisconsin. Then Came Trump., VOX (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2016/11/16/13645116/rural-resentment-elites-trump (analyzing the origins and meanings of
anti-elite fueled support for Donald Trump).
150. Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.
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will inevitably undermine the perceived legitimacy of that institution.
A general presumption of national over international jurisdiction is inherent in
the concept of complementarity. That balance was negotiated and agreed to at the
Rome Diplomatic Conference but was only crudely rendered into the text of the
Rome Statute. This left the judges of the ICC with the opportunity to define a more
technical and aggressive approach to complementarity that bears little resemblance
to what was agreed upon in Rome.
Once the ICC‘s practice moved beyond the political consensus on
complementarity, its claim to be technical and non-political lost credibility. This
can be attributed to the ICC‘s aggressive push to assert and extend its jurisdiction
in the Kenya cases. It is understandable that well-intentioned international officials
might want to promote greater ICC jurisdiction at any cost, but in today‘s still
positivist and consent-based legal order, the ICC cannot simply assume greater
legitimate authority than was voluntarily conceded to it by states. Brexit reminds
us that states can still say no to international institutions, especially when the latter
are perceived to be pushing too far into national life.
Many of the founders of the EU were federalists, who dreamed that their work
would eventually lead to a United States of Europe. The creation of ―ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe‖ has been a formally-stated goal since the
1947 Treaty of Rome.
Brexit represents a fundamental shift away from this approach, and indeed
away from elite-led policies of federalism or integration on the regional or global
level. More than a single decision by UK voters, the Brexit phenomenon represents
the re-emergence of centrifugal forces and nationalist perspectives both in politics
and in the international organization of states. These forces have darkened the
prospects for international organization worldwide, well beyond the EU, the AU,
and other regional organizations and unions. Many of these effects will no doubt
be negative. But on a more positive note, the global Brexit phenomenon now
looms as a flashing red light, warning that a general recalibration of the ICC‘s
complementary jurisdiction is very much needed to repair and restore the ICC‘s
standing.
Time will tell what the future of the ICC will be. Brexit is unlikely to herald
the end of international institutions, but it seems to portend a major change in the
zeitgeist, an attitudinal shift away from elite leadership and greater reliance upon
supranational institutions. Anne-Marie Slaughter recently suggested that ―[a]s a
regional organisation, [sic] the EU is phenomenally successful. . . . Where the EU
is failing is as a federal state.‖ Perhaps one lesson of Brexit is that sometimes
less can be more, or at least that less can be better.

151. The Founding Fathers of the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/history/founding-fathers_en (last visited March 1, 2016).
152. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, pmbl., 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
153. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Flexible forms of union offer a way forward for Europe,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), (July 19, 2016), at 11.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ICC was established bya multilateral treaty and is intended to be a
permanent international institution. As such, it must be careful not to over-step its
bounds. If the ICC can build a reputation for professionalism and responsible
action within the limited framework of its authority, it may eventually grow into a
more broadly relevant and effective international institution. On the other hand, if
it is generally perceived to be exceeding its agreed jurisdiction, it risks feeding
controversies that could undermine its credibility and future development.
Should the ICC be seen as part of the traditional world order in which state
sovereignty and state consent remain key limiting factors that must be respected by
any international institutions hoping to retain a reputation for legitimacy? Or,
should the ICC be viewed as part of a developing future order transcending the
positivistic restraints of the past as part of a ―Grotian Moment‖ of legal
transformation? The International Court of Justice has already ruled on a related
issue, declaring that even when peremptory norms of general international law are
at issue, that Court‘s jurisdiction still depends on the consent of the parties. It is
more important than ever to uphold this principle in this era of Brexit when, for
many, elite and supranational decision-making are inherently suspect and invite
powerful backlash.
Like it or not, the ICC is cutting its teeth on cases from Africa, where a
special set of post-colonial sensitivities apply. Seemingly oblivious to these
sensibilities, the ICC plowed forward precipitously with its Kenya cases, fueling
an unanticipated African nationalist response and rejection.
At the very least, the ICC can be critiqued for bad public relations. That
being said, the ICC‘s mistakes in Kenya went beyond mere public relations and
extended to basic lawyering and prosecution strategy. The ICC Prosecutor initiated
the investigation of the situation in Kenya proprio motu, which means that the ICC
picked this fight.
154. See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of
Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 439, 440
(2010) (examining concept of ―Grotian Moment,‖ a term denoting paradigm-shifting
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary international law are rapidly formed
and acceptance).
155. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 126, ¶ 125 (Feb. 3). ―Finally, the Court deems it necessary to recall that the
mere fact that rights and obligations erga omnes or peremptory norms of general international law
(jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself constitute an exception to the principle that
its jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the parties . . . .‖ Id.
156. Michael Meyer, Opinion, Kenya‟s Dubious Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/opinion/kenyas-dubious-day-in-court.html. ―These days,
even the most strenuous supporters of the court agree with its critics on one point: The
International Criminal Court‘s handling of the Kenyan case has done more damage to the
accusers than the accused. The court‘s reputation has suffered, perhaps fatally. By contrast, the
Kenyan president and his fellow-indictee, Deputy President William Ruto, are set to emerge from
the judicial ordeal as African folk heroes — the face of a new generation of independence fighters
to stand against American and European neocolonialists conspiring to bring them down.‖ Id..
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When it came time to prove its case against Kenyan President Kenyatta, the
Prosecutor‘s office was unprepared and it came to light that the ICC could not
present a credible case. To do so, the Prosecutor would need additional evidence
it had vainly requested from the Kenyan government. Yes, Kenya clearly violated
its obligation to cooperate with the Court, but it became equally clear that the
ICC‘s case had been launched prematurely. When the Kenya cases collapsed, the
ICC was faced with a humiliating debacle largely of its own creation and from
which it is still struggling to recover.
The South African government‘s decision not to arrest Sudanese President Al
Bashir demonstrated that vague but powerful notions of anti-colonialism and
African regional solidarity can prevail in practice over the formal legal obligations
of ICC States Parties. Although a few African states have taken things a step
further by attempting to withdraw from membership in the ICC, both South Africa
and Gambia have recently revoked their decisions to withdraw. Under the
circumstances, no clear trend is evident.
But even amid this growing tension, African states have played a positive role
in the ICC as well. By pushing back against ICC overreach, African states have
made their point and provided the Court with a much-needed remedial lesson on
the need for sensitivity, and yes, even humility, in the administration of
international justice. The first lesson learned should be that a sincerer effort is
needed to address the emerging African regional critique.
The ICC is perceived to be arrogant and closed. It needs to be more open. The
ICC cannot continue to pretend that its prosecutors and judges have all the answers
or that submissions from litigants are superfluous. There is no shame in admitting
that the mechanisms of international justice are still relatively new and largely
untested or that some initial decisions of the judges or of the Prosecutor may have
been mistaken. Admitting that there is a problem is sometimes the most essential
step in resolving it. When the judges of the ICC Appeals Chamber refused even to
accept additional arguments from the government of Kenya regarding its
admissibility challenge, it fueled a growing perception in Africa about the
arrogance of the ICC. If the ICC would show a modicum of humility and deference
in its treatment of sovereign states, this could be a first step towards bridging the
legitimacy gap.
Of course, humility, like prudence, is not a trait commonly associated with
criminal courts. Nonetheless, the ICC will need both qualities to survive, thrive,
and be effective in the perilous and unforgiving waters of international law and
diplomacy. Unlike the most effective national criminal courts, the ICC is not
embedded in a system where a powerful and well-established executive organ
stands ready to enforce its writ. Instead, the ICC has only the U.N. Security
Council, as a ―higher‖ body. The Security Council may occasionally reach
consensus on referring a particularly difficult situation to the ICC, but that has

157. See supra Section III.B.1.
158. Zgonec-Rožej, supra note 118.
159. See Onishi, op. cit. note 126.
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happened on only two occasions so far (Darfur and Libya), and even in these
cases Security Council follow-through has been minimal.
The Council‘s manifest inability to refer the current situation in Syria to the
jurisdiction of the ICC demonstrates that the members of the Security Council
(especially non-ICCs members such as the U.S., Russia, and China) do not
acknowledge a duty to refer even the most atrocious of situations. Even less so
do they feel the obligation to enforce the Court‘s orders against a recalcitrant state.
It is understandable that in this difficult environment the ICC struggles to survive
and to remain relevant.
From the start, there was an alternative path forward. The ICC Prosecutor
could have chosen to stress positive complementarity by working more patiently
with the Kenyan government‘s prosecuting authorities and taking the time to help
them to build a strong national capacity to prosecute serious international crimes
by political leaders. If this path had been successfully taken, it might have
demonstrated the potential of positive complementarity. As it occurred, the
Prosecutor pushed ahead with her own cases, showing little patience with the
Kenyan government‘s plan to create a special domestic tribunal to address them.
Ultimately, the failure of the ICC Kenya cases showcased for the world the Court‘s
inability to implement negative complementarity.
On substantive aspects of complementarity, the Prosecutor was equally
reckless, arguing that Kenya‘s admissibility challenge was misguided because that
government ―does not envisage the possibility for the Court and the relevant state
to concurrently exercise jurisdiction over different suspects for crimes arising out
of the same events.‖ The Appeals Chamber did not directly rule on this point as
it was not directly at issue, but the potential implications of this approach could be
enormous. If the ICC can freely exercise concurrent jurisdiction bringing its cases
even amid good faith national prosecutions, then the Court could be effectively
bootstrapped from a court of last resort into one with largely independent
jurisdiction. Complementarity was specifically intended to prevent this result.
As a formal matter, the judges of the ICC are vested with the authority to
determine the Court‘s jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of la compétence de la

160. Patrick Wintour, African exodus from ICC must be stopped, says Kofi Annan,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/african-exodus-in
ternational-criminal-court-kofi-annan.
161. William Pace, Curbing Security Council Vetoes, COALITION FOR THE ICC (Nov. 2,
2015), https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/11/02/curbing-security-council-vetoes/.
162. Prosecutor v. Mathaura, ICC-01/09-02-11 OA, Appeals Chamber Judgment ¶ 31 (Aug.
30, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_13819.PDF.
163. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19 (―The Court shall satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may, on its own motion, determine the
admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.‖); see also MALGOSIA FITZMAURICE &
OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 285 (2005) (―The
competence of international courts and tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction over a case is
universally recognized in international law.‖).
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compétence, international courts and tribunals generally claim this power.
Furthermore, it can quite cogently be argued that international judges should at
times judiciously use their authority to build, develop, and reorganize international
law. There must nonetheless be some practical limit to this expansive authority
or at least some possible way to remedy any fundamental problems not corrected
by the judges themselves. In theory, of course, the ICC‘s plenary body, the
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) could step in, but this would require the support
of many governments. It is possible that, working together and building a broader
coalition, the ICC‘s African States Parties could adjust the Court‘s approach to
complementarity via sponsorship of a resolution in the ASP.
Once the need to recalibrate complementarity is acknowledged, this goal
might in large part be accomplished simply through the Prosecutor‘s use of her
discretion to allow states greater flexibility, and time, to mount credible national
criminal proceedings. Having ruled so broadly, decisively, and precipitously on the
legal and technical aspects of admissibility, the ICC is now faced with a political
problem. The Court‘s prevailing standard of admissibility is fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic concept of complementarity as understood and agreed
to at the Rome Treaty Conference. To restore the perceived legitimacy and
credibility of the ICC, this problem will need to be addressed.
But African critics of the ICC would be well-advised not to focus their energy
and resources on negative tasks such as a campaign to withdraw from the ICC, to
discredit it, or to ensure the immunity of African heads of state from its
jurisdiction. Better they should focus on positive efforts to reform the ICC or
perhaps on the development of stronger more credible regional institutions
supporting international criminal justice. Chad‘s former dictator, Hissène Habré,
was charged with brutally killing as many as 40,000 people during his seven-year
reign. After pre-trial delays and a long trial, he was convicted of crimes against
humanity by the Extraordinary African Chambers, a special court established by
the AU under an agreement with Senegal. The case was a crucial test of African
resolve on international criminal justice issues, and at the very least indicates one
164. FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 163, at 285. According to this general principle an
international court or tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to settle any challenges to its
jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(6) (―In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.‖).
165. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at 2–3, Separate Opinion of Judge AbiSaab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (asserting international judges should interpret and build law).
166. See Jalloh, supra note 44, at 272 (―If the idea of complementarity underpinning Article
17 of the Rome Statute is to mean anything, it necessarily implies that member states must have a
degree of flexibility to exercise their discretion in deciding whom to prosecute.‖).
167. Bill Corcoran, Test case for African justice as leaders seek alternative, IRISH TIMES
(July 21, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/test-case-for-african-justice-asleaders-seek-alternative-1.2291297.
168. Dionne Searcey, Hissène Habré, Ex-President of Chad, Is Convicted of War Crimes,
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/world/africa/hissene-habreleader-chad-war-crimes.html.
169. Corcoran, supra note 167.
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possible way forward for international criminal justice in Africa.
Regarding the ICC‘s legitimacy gap, there are larger interests at stake here as
well. If the ICC and its judges can permanently extend its jurisdiction beyond what
was truly agreed to by the negotiating states at the Rome Conference, there could
be unanticipated negative consequences. The entire matter could become a
cautionary tale for the state representatives at any future treaty conference,
reminding them to be more skeptical than ever of assurances given about agreed
limits to the power of international institutions.
It has sometimes been argued that the 2000 NATO bombing of Serbia was
technically illegal because it was not authorized by the U.N. Security Council, but
was nonetheless legitimate because, halting genocide in Kosovo, it was the right
thing to do. The ICC may be facing a situation where its actions are formally
legal but those actions are nonetheless perceived to be illegitimate by a growing
number of State Parties. This would be a worst-case scenario for international
justice. To avoid this unhappy, result the ICC should carefully review the lessons
to be learned from the Kenya cases and undertake a general recalibration of
complementarity, re-emphasizing its originally intended role as a court of last
resort.

170. See THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO
REPORT 4–5 (2000) (explaining how the Kosovo intervention was concluded to be both legitimate
and illegal).

